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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BOUNTIFUL WATER SUB CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ET AL., 
Defendants .and Appellants. 1 
Case No. 
8426 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Prior to July 1, 1955, the Board of Directors of the 
Bountiful Subconservancy District ("respondent") fixed 
a general property tax levy of one-half mill upon the taxable 
property within the subdistrict's boundaries. In conformity 
with law, said subdistrict certified to the Board of County 
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Commissioners of Davis County ("appellants") the rate so 
fixed, and directed the levy. The appellants, pursuant to 
Section 59-9-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, filed a state-
ment with the State Tax Commission showing the amount 
and purpose of all taxes fixed by appellants, including the 
subdistrict levy. The Tax Commission, upon the advice of 
its legal division and the Attorney General of Utah held 
that the subdistrict levy had no foundation in law and 
therefore the county levy exceeded its permissable limit. 
The appellant therefore set aside the levy certified by re-
spondent. 
On September 17, 1955, respondents filed a complaint 
in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah, praying that appellants 
be required to levy the tax in question. The case was tried 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist on the 21st day 
of September, 1955 (R. 5). On the 27th day of September, 
1955, the Court filed its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, finding in substance that respondent is a public 
corporation ; that respondent had fixed a tax levy of one-
half mill on property within its boundat·ies in conformity 
with law; that appellants had been directed, but refused 
to levy the amount (R. 5, 6). The Court concluded that the 
state legislature intended to confer upon subconservancy 
districts the power to levy a general property tax on tax-
able property within its boundaries, and that respondent 
was so entitled (R. 6, 7). The Court adjudged and ordered 
appellants to levy a tax of one-half mill on all taxable prop-
erty within the limits of respondent's boundaries for the 
year 1955, and to collect and remit the same to respondent 
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(R. 8). Thereafter, on the 28th day of September, 1955, 
appellants filed their notice of appeal from such judgment 
(R. 23). 
The bases upon which the appellants set aside the ad 
valorem tax levy of respondents, and the bases upon which 
this appeal is taken are that: (1) The Utah statutes do 
not confer upon subconservancy districts the power of 
general property taxation; (2) the power to tax must be 
express or necessarily implied; (3) the nature of a sub-
conservancy district precludes the necessity of a general 
property tax. 
It is our conviction that the purpose for which a sub-
conservancy district is organized is that of satisfying local 
problems and improving particular lands. Primarily charged 
with the function of distributing water, a subconservancy 
district should derive its revenues from those land owners 
who benefit directly therefrom and in direct proportion to 
the improvement received. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT 
DOES NOT CONFER THE POWER OF AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON 
WATER SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS. 
(A). THE POWERS AND DUTIES CON-
FERRED UPON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF A SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICT BY 
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CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH 1951, ARE 
THOSE MANAGERIAL POWERS AND DUT-
IES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 100-11-13, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, (73-9-13, 
U. C. A., 1953). 
(B). THE MAXIMUM AD VALOREM TAX 
LEVY AUTHORIZED FOR WATER CONSER-
VANCY DISTRICTS vV AS NOT INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS. 
(C). WHERE THE INTENT OF AN AL-
LEGED TAX STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS OR 
DOUBTFUL, IT MUST BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND AGAINST 
THE TAXING AUTHORITY. 
POINT II 
THE POWER TO TAX MUST BE EXPRESS 
IN NATURE AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED IN 
TAXATION STATUTES. 
POINT III 
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1951, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF SUBDISTRICTS, DID NOT SUF-
FICIENTLY APPRISE THE LEGISLATURE 
THAT THE BODY OF THE ACT WAS TO 
HAVE INCLUDED THE ALLEGED POWER 
OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION 
BY SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS. 
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POINT IV 
TO ALLOW A SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICT 
THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY 
TAXATION RESULTS IN DOUBLE TAXATION 
WHICH IS TO BE A VOIDED AND NOT PRE-
SUMED. 
POINT V 
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DIS-
TRICT PRECLUDES THE NECESSITY OF AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT 
DOES NOT CONFER THE POWER OF AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION UPON 
WATER SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS. 
(A). THE POWERS AND DUTIES CON-
FERRED UPON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF A SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICT BY 
CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH 1951, ARE 
THOSE MANAGERIAL POWERS AND DUT-
IES ENUMERATED IN SECTION 100-11-13, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, (73-9-13, 
U. C. A., 1953). 
An analysis of the Utah statutes, especially the Utah 
Water Conservancy Act, Chapter 9 of Title 73, Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953, gives no indication that the legislature 
conferred upon subconservancy districts the power to levy 
an ad valorem property tax. There is no express provision 
granting such a power, nor can it be necessarily implied 
from the statute in point. 
According to the case of Patterick v. Carbon Water 
Conservancy District et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P. 2d 503, 
1944, the Utah Water Conservancy Act is patterned after 
the Colorado Water Conservancy statute. The latter act 
makes provision for the organization of subdistricts under 
Section 149-6-15, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, which 
in essential respects is identical with Section 100-11-14, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, the original Utah statute pro-
viding for subdistricts. Those statutes state in part as 
follows: 
"Whenever the court shall by its order duly 
entered of record, declare and decree such subdis-
tricts to be organized, the clerk of said court shall 
thereupon give notice of such order to the directors 
of the district who shall thereupon act also as direc-
tors of the subdistrict. Thereafter, the proceedings 
in reference to the subdistrict shall in all matters 
conform to the provision of this act except that in 
the appraisal of benefits for the purpose of S'tWk 
subdistricts, in the issuance of bonds, in levying of 
assessments and in aU other matters affecting only 
the subdistricts, the provisions of this act shall apply 
to the subdistrict as though it were an independent 
district, and it shall not in these things be amalga-
mated with the main district. The said petition for 
organization of a subdistrict shall also contain a 
statement of the amount or quantity of water for 
which said subdistrict desires to acquire the per-
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7 
petual use and the amount of money that said sub-
district is willing to pay therefor, and the court 
shall, prior to the entry of its decree organizing any 
territory into a subdistrict obtain the verified con-
sent of the board to furnish such perpetual use of 
water for the purposes therein specified to such sub-
districts at a price and upon the term mentioned in 
the petition, then the court shall be authorized to 
enter its decree of organization of such subdistrict." 
(Emphasis added.) 
There have been no decisions in Colorado or Utah con-
struing the foregoing provision as embracing the power 
of ad valorem property taxation, nor has it been asserted 
in this action that a subdistrict formerly had the power 
to levy a general property tax under that statute. Fur-
thermore, the present status of conservancy districts in 
Colorado is indicative that an interpretation permitting 
such a power would be a strained one. 
For example, under Articles 8 and 9 of Chapter 149, 
Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, the Colorado River Con-
servancy District and the Southwestern Water Conservancy 
District were created by legislative enactment, with provi-
sion therein for organizing subdistricts. Both chapters 
provide expressly for maintenance taxation by a subdistrict 
and enumerate the levy limitations and procedure for such 
taxation. Such express authorization is not present in the 
general Colorado Water Conservancy Act. It is not present 
in the Utah Water Conservancy Act and cannot be neces-
sarily implied. It is therefore submitted that there was 
no power for a subdistrict to levy a general property tax 
under the original Utah statute dealing with subdistricts, 
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and that the amendments thereto have not conferred the 
power. 
Respondents, however, contended in the lower court 
that a 1951 amendment to the Utah Water Conservancy 
Act delegated the power of ad valorem property taxation 
to a subconservancy district. That amendment, Chapter 
120, Laws of Utah, 1951, provides as follows: 
"Subdistricts may be organized upon the peti-
tion of the owners of real property, within or partly 
within and partly without the district, which peti-
tion shall be in substantially the same form and shall 
fulfill the same requirements concerning the sub-
districts as the petition outlined in section 4 of this 
chapter as amended is required to fulfill, concern-
ing the organization of the main district. Such peti-
tion shall also contain a statement of the quantity 
of water which the subdistrict proposes to acquire 
from the district for perpetual use and the court 
shall, prior to the entry of its decree organizing a 
subdistrict, require that the petitioners attach to the 
petition written evidence of the consent of the board 
of directors of the district to furnish to such sub-
district the perpetual use of water for the purpose 
therein specified. Petitions for the organization of 
subdistricts shall be filed with the clerk of the court 
and shall be accompanied by a bond as provided for 
in section 5 of this chapter. The procedure for the 
organization of subdistricts shall be the same as 
for the organization of districts, except that the 
provisions of section 4 of this chapter as amended 
respecting the minimum assessed value of land and 
improvements within districts shall not apply to sub-
districts. A subdistrict shall be a separate entity 
within the district and shall have authority to con-
tact with the district for the furnishing of water 
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and for other purposes. Within thirty days after 
entering the decree incorporating a subdistrict, the 
court shall appoint a board of directors of not ex-
ceeding seven persons who are owners of real prop-
erty in the subdistrict, and who are not directors of 
the district. The provisions of section 9 of this chap-
ter as amended, except as to the number of directors, 
shall be applicable to subdistricts. The board of 
directors of a subdistrict shall have the same powers 
and duties as a district board." 
The foregoing amendment confers no express authori-
zation to levy a general property tax. 
It is submitted that when the legislators passed Chap-
ter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, their minds were directed to 
Section 100-11-13, Utah Code Annotated 1943, (73-9-13, U. 
C. A. 1953), as enumerating the powers and duties con-
ferred upon a subconservancy district board by that phrase 
which provides that a subdistrict "shall have the same 
powers and duties as a district board." Section 73-9-13, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, is specifically entitled, "Powers 
of board of district". It does not include the power of gen-
eral property taxation, but does enumerate those manager-
ial powers necessary for the perpetuation of a conservancy 
district. Because of the heading of Section 73-9-13 and the 
fact that the same precedes the provision establishing sub-
districts, it is both reasonable and logical to conclude that 
the legislature intended that those powers and duties 
granted in Chapter 120 were those enumerated in Section 
73-9-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
It is apparent from an analysis of the Water Conser-
vancy Act and the amendment thereto (Chapter 120, Laws 
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of Utah 1951) that the primary concern of the legislature 
in passing the amendment was to change the governmental 
structure of a subconservancy district including the num-
ber and qualifications of the Board of Directors and the 
provision that the boards of the parent and subdistricts 
must be composed of different personnel. Such change in 
governmental structure required a delegation of managerial 
powers to the subconservancy district board. Inasmuch as 
there has been no allegation or claim that a subconservancy 
district had the power of ad valorem property taxation prior 
to the 1951 amendment, the mere change in the govern-
mental structure of a subconservancy district cannot nec-
essarily imply that the subdistrict acquired all of the pow-
ers of a parent conservancy district, including that of rais-
ing revenue through a general property tax. This is par-
ticularly true where the statute provides other sources of 
revenue. (The latter point will be discussed under Point 
III herein.) 
(B). THE MAXIMUM AD VALOREM TAX 
LEVY AUTHORIZED FOR WATER CONSER-
VANCY DISTRICTS WAS NOT INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS. 
Under Section 73-9-16, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, a 
district may levy and collect a general property tax within 
certain maximum rates. A relevant part of that section 
provides: 
"To levy and collect taxes under class A as 
herein provided, the board shall, in each year, de-
termine the amount of money necessary to be raised 
by taxation, taking into consideration other sources 
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of revenue of the district, and shall fix a rate of levy 
which when levied upon every dollar of assessed 
valuation of property within the district, and with 
other revenues will raise the amount required by 
the district, to supply funds for paying expenses of 
organization, for surveys and plans, paying the cost 
of construction, operating and maintaining the 
works of the district; provided, however, that said 
rate shall not exceed one-half mill on the dollar, prior 
to the commencement of construction of the works, 
and thereafter not to exceed one mill on the dollar, 
of assessed valuation of the property within the 
district; provided further, that in districts to be 
served by water apportioned by the Colorado River 
Compact to the Lower Basin, the levy after construc-
tion may be increased to not to exceed five mills on 
the dollar of assessed valuation of property within 
the district." (Emphasis added.) 
Did the Legislature intend that a subconservancy district 
should have the same powers of ad valorem property taxa-
tion as a parent conservancy district, and are the maximum 
levies authorized under the above statute to apply in the 
case of the subdistrict? 
According to respondent's position, if a subconservancy 
district is organized within a parent conservancy district 
served by water apportioned by the Colorado River Com-
pact to the Lower Basin, the levy limit of the subdistrict's 
taxation power would be five mills, the same as the power 
of a main district. Such a result might produce a total water 
conservancy tax of ten mills on all property within the sub-
district. Claimants of a subconservancy district's power to 
tax general property must face the possible ten mill levy 
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12 
as the logical result of their position. While it is within 
the power of the legislature to authorize such a tax, the 
levy amount is of importance in ascertaining legislative 
intent. It is submitted that the peculiar structure of the 
levy maximum amendment is evidence that the legislature 
did not intend that a subconservancy district should have 
the power of general property taxation, the 5-mill authori-
zation being only applicable to a parent conservancy dis-
trict. The fact that the act quoted places a levy limit which 
a district shall "not exceed" indicates the reluctance of 
the Legislature to impose a burden greater than that speci-
fied upon the property owners of the district. The poten-
tial levy that might result if respondent's position is 
adopted, raises a serious question of legislative intent, and 
would subject property owners in certain parts of the state 
to an undue tax burden, the authorization for which has 
no foundation in our law. 
Furthermore, testimony presented in the lower court 
reveals that the present section, codified as 73-9-16, U. C. 
A. 1953, was an amendment enacted in 1951, changing the 
levy maximum for those districts affected by the Colorado 
River Compact water allotment to the Lower Basin. Evi-
dence indicated that the legislative committee which con-
sidered the 1951 amendment (Chapter 121), was not con-
cerned with, or did it anticipate that the five mill maximum 
applied to a subdistrict (R. 18). If the five mill levy did not 
apply to subdistricts organized in areas served by the Colo-
rado River Compact (Lower Basin), logical reasoning would 
lead to the conclusion that the one mill levy maximum also 
does not apply to subconservancy districts of the state. It 
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is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature would dele-
gate the power of general property taxation to a subdistrict 
without placing a maximum limit or restriction thereon. 
Therefore, with no statute specifying a limit for the alleged 
tax power, there is serious doubt as to whether it was 
intended that the subconservancy district should have the 
power of general property taxation. 
During the regular session of the 1951 Legislature, two 
amendments were introduced and passed affecting the 
Water Conservancy Act. Chapter 120 relating to the water 
conservancy districts and the organization of subdistricts, 
originated in the Senate as S. B. 225 and was passed on 
March 8, 1951. Chapter 121, which related to water con-
servancy districts and the limiting of general property tax 
levies, originated in the House of Representatives as H. B. 
133, and it was passed March 8, 1951. It is to be noted that 
the bills in question originated in separate houses ; that 
there was no reference in either bill to the other, and no 
material connection between the acts. There has been no 
assertion that a joint committee of both houses considered 
the bills, nor that any of the legislators contemplated that 
the legislation referred to was related. It is submitted that 
this court should not find any basis for concluding that 
Chapters 120 and 121, Laws· of Utah 1951, were related 
in substance, but rather that their passage in the same 
session of the Legislature was the result of separate legis-
lative bodies considering two different and separate needs 
of the water conservancy program. 
In construing the legislative intent in enacting Chap-
ter 120, Laws of Utah, 1951, it should be noted that the bill 
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was passed at the conclusion of the legislative session and 
no dissenting vote is recorded. This factor, while not con-
trolling, raises some question as to whether the Legislature 
considered Chapter 120 as including the power of ad val-
orem taxation by subconservancy district since no opposi-
tion in recorded to the passage of the act-a feature not 
typical of the enactment of tax statutes. 
(C). \VHERE THE INTENT OF AN AL-
LEGED TAX STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS OR 
DOUBTFUL, IT MUST BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND AGAINST 
THE TAXING AUTHORITY. 
It is a general principle of law that tax statutes doubt-
ful in meaning are to be construed against the taxing 
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. 51 Am. Jur., Taxa-
tion, Section 316, p. 366. The leading treatise on taxation, 
Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 1, 4th Ed., Section 83, states: 
"Constitutional provisions or statutes, claimed 
to delegate the power to tax, will be strictly con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer, in determining 
whether any power of taxation has been delegated 
and also, where it is conceded that some power to 
tax has been delegated, in determining the scope 
of the delegated powe'i*." (see also Sec. 507.) 
Utah has applied the above principle and in the case of 
Norville v. The State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d 
937, this court stated: 
"The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case 
of doubt as to the intention of the legislature to be, 
construed strictly against the taxing authority and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
in favor of those on whom the tax is levied, has 
been well set out in the case of H elvering v. Stock-
holms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 
L. Ed. 211." 
See, also, Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Richards·, 52 Utah 
1, 172 P. 474; "F?. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Com-
mission, 90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629. 
The South Carolina Suprerne Court has referred to the 
above principle as "a salutary rule and one which is for 
the protection of the taxpayer against the arm of a taxing 
body." Pacolet Mfg. Co. v. Query, et al., 17 4 S. C. 359, 
177 S. E. 653. This rationale explains the reluctance of 
courts to imply taxing powers and impose a burden upon 
taxpayers beyond that which is expressly stipulated in 
legislation. Sections 73-9-15, 16 and 18, U. C. A. 1953 
reflect such ambiguity or doubt regarding the power of 
ad valorem property taxation by subconservancy districts 
that the foregoing rules of law should apply and the doubts 
be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. 
The alleged ad valorem tax power of a subdistrict must 
find its origin in Section 73-9-15, U. C. A., 1953, if any 
place. That section provides that parent districts may raise 
revenue by various methods or combinations thereof, as 
follows: 
"In addition to the other means of providing 
revenue for such districts as herein provided, the 
board shall have power and authority to levy and 
collect taxes and special assessments for maintain-
ing and operating such works and paying the obli-
gations and indebtedness of the district by any one 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
or more of the methods or combinations thereof, 
classified as follows: 
"Class A. To levy and collect taxes upon all 
property within the district as hereinafter provided. 
"Class B. To levy and collect assessments for 
special benefits accruing to property within munici-
palities for which use of water is allotted as here-
inafter provided. 
"Class C. To levy and collect assessments for 
special benefits accruing to lands within irrigation 
districts for which use of water is allotted as here-
inafter provided. 
"Class D. To levy and collect assessments for 
special benefits accruing to lands for which use of 
water is allotted as hereinafter provided." 
If a subdistrict has the same powers of taxation as a 
parent district, one would expect to find that a subdistrict 
could freely levy under Classes A, B, C, and D as set forth 
above. But such is not the case. Sections 73-9-17 through 
19, U. C. A. 1953, give amplification and clarification to 
the manner and method of levying those taxes under Class 
B, C, and D, as set forth in Section 73-9-15, U. C. A. 1953 
quoted above. Under Class C a district board may sell or 
lease water to irrigation districts. Under 73-9-18, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended, the procedure outlined for the lease or 
sale provides that should an irrigation district desire to 
purchase or obtain the beneficial use of the water of a 
water conservancy district, the board of such irrigation 
district shall, by resolution, authorize and direct its presi-
dent and secretary to petition for an allotment of water 
upon certain terms which are not pertinent for our discus-
sion here. The water conservancy district board of directors 
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may hear the petition and any objections thereto. Section 
73-9-18 as arnended then provides further: 
"The board may, at its discretion, accept or 
reject the said petition, but if it deems it for the 
best interest of the district that said petition shall 
be granted, shall enter an order to that effect grant-
ing the said petition, and from and after such order, 
the irrigation district, andjor persons therein shall 
be deemed to have purchased, leased, or otherwise 
acquired the beneficial use of water as set forth in 
said order. If said petition is granted, the board 
shall, in each year, determine the amount of money 
necessary to be raised by special assessment on 
lands within such irrigation district and shall de-
termine whether such special assessment shall be 
levied by the district or by the irrigation district. 
If the board determines that such assessments shall 
be levied by the district, it shall certify to the county 
assessor of the county in which the lands of such 
irrigation district are located the amount of the 
assessment, plus a fair proportionate amount of the 
estimated operating and maintenance charges for 
the next succeeding year on each tract of land on or 
before the first day of July of each year, and such 
county assessor shall extend the amount of such 
special assessment, plus said operating and mainten-
ance charges on the tax roll as a special assessment 
against the lands on which said special assessment 
is made. If the board determines that such assess-
ments shall be levied by the irrigation district, the 
district shall make a contract with the irrigation 
district which shall provide among other things for 
the annual payment to the district of an amount to 
be obtained from the levy by the irrigation district 
of annual assessments in accordance with the irri-
gation district law. If subdistrict or subdistricts 
are organized as herein provided, assessments of 
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special benefits shall be made, spread on the taa: 
rolls and collected in the same manner as herein 
provided in the case of irrigation districts." (Em-
phasis added.) 
It is to be noted that if a subdistrict is organized as 
provided under the Water Conservancy Act, special assess-
ments are to be made and collected as provided in the case 
of irrigation districts. Such procedure would require that 
the board of a subdistrict must petition the board of the 
parent district for the purchase of water and that the parent 
board may, at its discretion, accept or reject the petition; 
that the parent board shall determine the amount of money 
necessary to be raised by special assessment ; and that the 
parent board shall determine whether suck special assess-
ment shall be levied by the district or by the subdistrict. 
Section 73-9-18, supra, therefore, indicates that a subdistrict 
is subordinate to the parent district and is dependent upon 
the approval and determination of the parent district re-
garding the amount of money that may be raised by special 
assessment and the manner in which it shall be collected. 
If a subdistrict has the same taxation powers as a 
parent district, it is submitted that a subdistrict would in 
no way be dependent upon the approval or determination 
of a parent district to levy a special assessments tax, nor 
would it be required to be bound by the decision of a parent 
district that a contemplated purchase of water would be for 
the best interest of the area affected. In fact, if a subdis-
trict has the taxation powers of a parent district, then it 
should be able to levy and collect assessments for special 
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benefits without the approval or decisiOn of any other 
political subdivision of the state. 
If a subdistrict does not have the same power as a 
parent district to freely levy and collect special benefits 
assessments under Class C as set forth in Section 73-9-15, 
U. C. A. 1953, there is serious question whether it has the 
power to levy and collect taxes upon general property as set 
forth in Class A thereof, which is the source from which its 
alleged taxing power must emanate. 
That the treatment of a subdistrict under Class C is 
not an exception or limitation to other powers of taxation 
is evident from an analysis of the history of Section 73-9-18, 
U. C. A. 1953. Under the 1941 Water Conservancy Act, 
there was never an allegation or claim that a subconser-
vancy district had the power to levy a general property 
tax. Section 100-11-14, U. C. A. 1943, contemplates a special 
assessments tax that might be levied by a subdistrict, but 
grants no additional taxation powers and inasmuch as the 
directors of the parent conservancy district and subdistrict 
were to be the same individuals under that legislation, the 
powers of the subdistrict were largely dependent upon the 
decisions and determinations of the board of directors when 
acting as the board of the parent district. The section now 
codified as 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, is the result 
of several amendments passed since 1941, but each amend-
ment has contained the provision that if subdistricts are 
organized, the assessments of special benefits should be 
made and collected in the same manner as in a case of 
irrigation districts, that is, in the manner to be determined 
by the parent district. Section 1 of Chapter 132, Laws of 
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Utah 1953, now codified as 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended, reflects the most recent pronouncement regard-
ing the manner of making and collecting special assessments 
by a subdistrict, and reflects the legislative intent to limit 
the scope of a subconservancy district's tax power. 
The holding of the district court that a subdistrict had 
the same powers of taxation as a parent district was in 
contravention of legislative fiat and did not give due 
consideration to the manner and method of making and 
collecting special benefits tax as outlined in Section 73-9-18, 
U. C. A. 1953, as amended. The court below erred in placing 
no limitation on a subconservancy district's power of taxa-
tion by authorizing that Classes A, B, C, and D under 
Section 73-9-15, U. C. A. 1953, may be freely levied 
and assessed by a subdistrict without regard for the 
limitation specified by the Legislature. It is submitted that 
Section 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, raises such doubt as to the 
intent of the Legislature regarding the general property 
taxation power of a subconservancy district that the general 
rules of tax statute interpretation should be applied and the 
ambiguity resolved in favor of the taxpayer. 
POINT II 
THE PO\VER TO TAX MUST BE EXPRESS 
IN NATURE AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED IN 
TAXATION STATUTES. 
It is a general rule of law that a tax cannot be imposed 
without clear and express language, and words of a tax 
statute must be given ordinary meaning and may not be 
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extended by implication. In the case of Sayles v. Commis-
sioner of Corporations and Taxation, 286 Mass. 102, 189 
N. E. 579, the court stated: 
"In construing the statute we have in mind that 
tax statutes must be construed strictly, and that the 
power to tax must be found expressed in apt words 
and cannot be deduced by implication." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Osgood v. Tax Commissioner, 235 Mass. 88, 126 N. E. 371; 
Deblois v. Commissioner of CoTporations and Taxation, 276 
Mass. 437, 177 N. E. 566. Also 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec-
tion 310, and cases cited therein. 
In the case before this court, there is no express stat-
utory authorization granting the power of ad valorem 
property taxation to a subconservancy district. Therefore, 
it is submitted that the foregoing principle of law should 
apply, and the power denied. 
We are aware that under certain circumstances courts 
have departed from the general rule above and held that a 
municipal corporation's tax power may be granted by nec-
essary implication. However, it is our conviction that a 
subconservancy district qualifies neither as a municipality 
nor quasi municipality. According to Lehi City v. Meiling, 
87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530, a state agency is quasi municipal 
in nature only if it serves a public purpose or benefit. A 
conservancy district meets such a test, but the subdistrict 
does not, for it is submitted that its object is to benefit local 
interests or improve particular lands. Therefore, whatever 
exceptions to the general rule of tax statute interpretation 
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are applicable in the case of a municipality should not be 
material here. 
Nevertheless, should it be found that a subconservancy 
district is quasi municipal in nature and sufficiently similar 
to a municipality to invoke the exception noted, this court 
should nevertheless follow the proposition that tax powers 
of a municipality are subject to strict statutory construc-
tion. 
As is stated in 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th 
Ed., Vol. 1, § 237, p. 448-50: 
"It is a general and undisputed proposition of 
law that a municipal corporation can possess and 
can exercise the following powers, and no others: 
First, those granted in express words; second, those 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the 
powers expressly granted ; third, those essential to 
the accomplishment of the declared objects and 
purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, 
but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial 
doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved 
by the courts against the corporation, and the power 
is denied." 
The foregoing statement has received acceptance by 
this court in Nasfell v. Ogden City, (Utah), 249 P. 2d 
507, Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Ut. 504, 124 P. 2d 537, 
and cases cited therein. 
In the case of l'rloss v. The Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961, this court 
stated: 
"The City's power to tax is derived solely from 
legislative enactment and it has only such authority 
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as is expressly conferred or necessarily implied. 
This court has not favored the extension of the 
powers of the city by implication, and the only modi-
fication of such doctrine is where the power is one 
which is necessarily implied. Unless this require-
ment is met, the power cannot be deduced from any 
consideration of convenience or necessity, or desira-
bility of such result, and no doubtful inference from 
other powers granted or from ambiguous or uncer-
tain provisions of the law would be sufficient to 
sustain such authority. This is a fortiori true in the 
instant situation, because in case of any ambiguity 
or uncertainty as to authority to impose taxes, the 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In view of the foregoing authority a municipal cor-
poration may not exercise powers by implication unless such 
power is necessarily implied. Inasmuch as there can be no 
necessary implication in the case before us, and since the 
power of general property taxation cannot be deduced from 
any consideration of convenience or necessity, the same 
should not be allowed here. 
The Water Conservancy Act gives such power to sub-
districts under the section entitled, "Powers of a board of 
district", that certain sources of funds are available and 
are sufficient to meet the needs contemplated. Under sub-
section (m) of Section 73-9-13, U. C. A. 1953, a subcon-
servancy district has power to borrow money and incur 
indebtedness. It has power under subsection (f) to levy a 
special assessments tax, as clarified in Section 73-9-18, U. 
C. A. 1953, as amended, which outlines the procedure of 
collecting and making said levy. Subsection (g) of Section 
73-9-13 provides the power to fix rates at which water may 
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be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of. Subsection (q) of 
the same section, as amended in 1953, authorizes the sale 
of water or water service to individual customers at speci-
fied rates. Subsection (r) allows the district or, in this 
case, the subdistrict, to make and collect fees and charges 
for customer connections to the works of the subdistrict 
and such proceeds to be used to discharge any indebtedness 
of the subdistrict. 
The foregoing provisions indicate the various means 
of raising revenue of which a subdistrict may avail itself, 
and inasmuch as the Bountiful subdistrict's main purpose 
for organization is that of distributing water, it would seem 
feasible that such sources and possibilities would provide 
adequate funds to effect the program contemplated. Ad-
mitting the convenience of obtaining funds through ad 
valorem property taxation, we submit that convenience 
alone is not an argument nor is necessity an argument, and 
in the absence of authority to the contrary, a subconser-
vancy district should not be entitled to a method of taxation 
not express in nature, or otherwise indispensable. 
POINT III 
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1951, PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF SUBDISTRICTS, DID NOT SUF-
FICIENTLY APPRISE THE LEGISLATURE 
THAT THE BODY OF THE ACT 'VAS TO 
HAVE INCLUDED THE ALLEGED POWER 
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OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION 
BY SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICTS. 
Most U. S. jurisdictions, Utah included, have adopted 
constitutional provisions to the effect that the subject or 
object of an act must be expressed or adequately described 
in its title. Article VI, Section 23 of the Constitution of 
Utah provides : 
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills 
for the codification and general revision of laws, no 
bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, 
which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Em-
phasis added.) 
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 166, at page 146, states the 
purpose of such constitutional provision to be as follows : 
"The aim of the constitutional provision is to 
give information as to the subject of legislation with 
which the act deals, to apprise the members of the 
Legislature, and the people, of the subject of legisla-
tion under consideration, or to challenge the atten-
tion of those affected by the act to its provisions, so 
that they may have an opportunity of being heard 
thereon if they so desire." (Emphasis added.) 
The title of Chapter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, providing for 
the organization of a subdistrict states: 
"An Act Amending Section 100-11-14, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 95, 
Laws of Utah 1949, Relating to Water Conservancy 
Districts and the Organization of Subdistricts, and 
Providing the Method for Organizing such Subdis-
tricts, for the Appointment of the Board of Direc-
tors and the Powers and Duties of Such Board." 
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It is submitted that a reading of the title of Chapter 120 
now codified as Section 73-9-14, U. C. A., 1953, does no1 
adequately apprise nor reasonably call to the attention oj 
the legislators or the public the object of the legislation 
thereunder, if the power to levy an ad valorem property 
tax is contained in the body of the act. 
In the case of Percival v. Cowychee and Wide Hollow 
Irrigation District, 15 Wash. 480, 46 P. 1035, the court held 
that "a title which shows nothing more than that the act 
is to provide for the organization and government of irriga-
tion districts and the sale of bonds arising therefrom is 
[not] broad enough to warrant the enactment thereunder 
of a provision for the validating of the indebtedness of a 
district which might have been organized thereunder and 
the levying of a tax to pay the same." In that case the 
court recognized that a title is sufficient if it directs the 
n1inds of the legislators to propositions that are reasonable 
or have a natural connection with the subject matter of 
the title. The holding of the Percival case and the tests 
mentioned were affirmed in the more recent case of Gruen 
v. The Tax Commission, (Wash.), 211 P. 2d 651, where 
the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
"An act providing for the organization and 
government of irrigation districts is not broad 
enough to include validation of bonds and the levy-
ing of a tax." 
Applying the above principles to the facts before us, 
this court should find that the title of an act which provides 
for the organization and government of a subdistrict is not 
broad enough to wnrrant the enactment thereunder of a 
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provision authorizing the levying of a general property 
tax. Inasmuch as a title of an act is sufficient to the extent 
that it directs the minds of the legislators to reasonable or 
natural connections, there is serious doubt that Utah legis-
lators considered the title of Chapter 120 as embracing 
the power of ad valorem property taxation, since there is 
no indication in either the title or body of the act that the 
Legislature intended to include the general property tax 
power. 
In the case of Saville v. Corliss, 46 U. 495, 151 P. 51, 
this court held that when the subject of an act is not clearly 
expressed in the title, the act is invalid. If Chapter 120, 
Laws of Utah 1951, is to be construed as including the 
power of ad valorem property taxation, then the act must 
be held invalid as contravening Section 23 of Article VI of 
the Utah Constitution. Appellants contend, however, that 
the act is void only if the substance of Chapter 120 includes 
tax powers that would not be contemplated by the legisla-
tors or be reasonably brought to their attention by the title 
of that act. The power to levy a general property tax is an 
enlargement upon the subject matter contained in Chapter 
120, Laws of Utah 1951, the title of which would not be ob-
jectionable if the act were interpreted as not including the 
power to levy an ad valorem property tax. 
POINT IV 
TO ALLOW A SUBCONSERV ANCY DISTRICT 
THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY 
TAXATION RESULTS IN DOUBLE TAXATION 
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WHICH IS TO BE AVOIDED AND NOT PRE-
SUMED. 
If the lower court's conclusions of law are correct, 
which we in no wise admit, then a subconservancy district's 
ad valorem property tax levy, when added to the tax levy 
of the parent district, results in double taxation. As a gen-
eral rule of law, the courts will not favor double taxation 
in any form unless the statutes so clearly require it that no 
other construction is possible in reason. According to 51 
Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 286, p. 340: 
"While, as has been pointed out, it is not every 
form of double taxation which will be considered 
invalid, the courts are generally agreed that double 
taxation in any form is not favored, but is to be 
a voided, and that the intention of the legislature to 
impose it will not be presumed. Before a tax statute 
will be interpreted as providing for double taxation, 
the intention so to do must be shown by clear and 
unequivocal language which leaves no doubt as to 
the legislative intent." 
Double taxation exists if both taxes have been imposed 
in the same year, for the same purpose, by the same taxing 
authority, and upon property owned by the same person. 
51 Am. Jur., Taxation, Sec. 284. 
The "·eber Basin \Vater Conservancy District and 
the Bountiful Subconservancy District are both clearly 
levying an ad valorem property tax during the same year 
and on the property of those persons within the subconser-
vancy district area. The two corporations are also levying 
the tax for identical purposes, i. e., water conservancy, 
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inasmuch as both are alleged to have the same powers and 
duties, and therefore could effectuate the same end pro-
gram. This phase of dual taxation carries the attendant 
danger that members of the subconservancy district are 
paying twice for benefits that they are entitled to as partici-
pants in the parent district. 
The close relationship between parent and subdistricts 
indicates that the same taxing authority is levying both 
taxes in question. According to Section 73-9-14, U. C. A. 
1953, a prerequisite for the organization of a subdistrict 
is the filing and acceptance of a petition by owners of real 
property within the contemplated area of the subdistrict. 
That section provides further : 
"Such petition shall also contain a statement of 
the quantity of water which the subdistrict proposes 
to acquire from the district for perpetual use and 
the court shall prior to the entry of its decree organ-
izing a subdistrict require that the petitioner attach 
to the petition certain evidence of the consent of the 
board of directors of the district to furnish such 
subdistrict the perpetual use of water for the pur-
pose therein specified." 
This provision would indicate such close relationship exists 
between the parent and subdistrict that the same or closely 
related authorities are levying the taxes in question. This 
relationship and interdependence is further borne out by 
Section 73-9-18, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. 
Inasmuch as a tax law will not be construed to tax the 
same property twice and there is a presumption against 
an intention on the part of legislators to impose a double 
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tax without specific expression to the contrary, this court 
must avoid the dual burden attempted to be imposed herein. 
Double taxation does not exist where a special assess-
ments tax is added to an owner's existing general property 
levy, and it is therefore not a dual burden if a subconser-
vancy district is allowed the power of special benefits tax 
even though the parent district may exact an ad valorem 
property tax. 
POINT V 
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DIS-
TRICT PRECLUDES THE NECESSITY OF AD 
VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION. 
We have previously herein discussed our conviction that 
the "powers" meant to be conferred on subconservancy dis-
tricts by Chapter 120, Laws of Utah 1951, were only those 
enumerated in Section 100-11-13, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, (73-9-13, U. C. A. 1953). If this legislative intent 
is not clear from the statutory language, we believe it is 
apparent from the nature of the entity "subdistrict" which 
the legislature here created. The granting of a general tax 
power to a taxing unit is predicated on the premise that 
such a unit will promote a general benefit. It is generally 
conceded, for instance, that an irrigation or drainage dis-
trict may not levy a general property tax because the con-
templated benefits will inure to particular lands rather 
than the community as a whole. In Patterick v. Carbon 
Water Conservancy District, supra, this Court recognized 
the foregoing principle and distinguished a district organ-
ized under the Water Conservancy Act as being for a public 
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purpose. Other cases noting the necessity of general com-
munity benefits to support a general tax levy include People 
v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P. 2d 274, and Cosman v. 
Chestnut Valley Irrigation District, 74 Mont. 111, 238 P. 
879. 
Section 73-9-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, does not set out in detail the reasons why "sub-
districting" is considered necessary or salutary. The lan-
guage does suggest, however, that the purpose of a sub-
district would be to satisfy a need of local land owners 
which is not common to the parent district. Such an ap-
praisal of the subdistrict concept conforms with the Colo-
rado statutes, wherein the Colorado Water Conservancy Act 
provides for the organization of subdistricts, but makes no 
provision for the exercise of ad valorem property taxation 
powers. Moreover, the Colorado legislature, in creating the 
Colorado River Conservancy District and the Southwestern 
Water Conservancy District, recognized the peculiar needs 
of those areas and in providing for the creation of subdis-
tricts therein deviated from the provisions of the general 
water conservancy act and expressly authorized ad valorem 
property levies by the subconservancy districts. 
For the purpose of satisfying local problems, a sub-
district may levy a special tax pursuant to Section 73-9-
13 (f) and (I), Utah Code Annotated 1953. It may also derive 
revenue from other sources, an enumeration of which we 
have set forth in Point III herein. There is ample indication 
that the legislature intended that a subdistrict acquire its 
water from the parent district and the organizing petition 
must contain a statement of the quantity of water the sub-
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district proposes to acquire, and the ratification by thE 
parent district. The activity productive of a general com. 
munity benefit is intended to be carried on by the parent 
district. 
The subdistrict on the other hand appears to be neces-
sary as an organization only because a local problem exists 
for which district funds could not be properly applied. The 
prime example of such local problem is a distribution or 
drainage system. Such would justify the organization of a 
subdistrict in our view. The subconservancy district makes 
sense only as a special improvement district. According to 
the case of People v. Letford, supra, subdistricts, cities, irri-
gation districts and similar organizations who "become 
liable for * * * special assessments through agree-
ment with the water conservancy district themselves ascer-
tain the amount of the benefit and the extent of their lia,. 
bility in applying for the water which they deem necessary 
for their purposes. These contracts are the basis for the 
lien created by the act against the property of the applicant 
for water". (Emphasis added.) The Colorado statutes or-
ganizing specific conservation districts mentioned above, 
refer to subdistricts and improvement districts synony-
mously. Therefor the subdistricts should tax only those 
lands directly benefitted by the improvement. 
To further support our conviction as to the nature of a 
subdistrict, we would like to direct the attention of the 
court to Section 73-9-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, whereill 
the organization requirements of a conservancy district 
include a minimum assessed property valuation. This h 
material in view of the ad valorem property taxation powe1 
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of the district. In order for a district to make use of the 
ad valorem tax power a minimum valuation requirement is 
essential to insure that a significant amount will be derived 
from any given levy. Contrast the foregoing valuation re-
quirement with the provision in Section 73-9-14, U. C. A. 
1953. A subdistrict under that section may be organized 
irrespective of the value of the land or improvements there-
in. We submit that the foregoing difference in the require-
ments for organizing a subdistrict and main district is 
further indication that the legislature had no intention of 
giving the subconservancy district the power of general 
property taxation and therefore was not concerned with a 
requirement of land valuation for its organization. 
The history of the Utah Water Conservancy Act indi-
cates that the subconservancy districts have generally been 
considered vehicles of water distribution and logically 
should derive their revenues from users of the water 
through the making and collecting of rates or fees or levy-
ing a special assessments tax where those who benefit most 
would bear the commensurate burden. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing authority and reasons, we 
submit that the judgment and order of the lower court 
should be reversed and this Court decree and direct that the 
Board of County Commissioners of Davis County set aside 
the general property tax levy proposed by the Bountiful 
Subconservancy District. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
RAYMOND W. GEE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
MILTON J. HESS, 
County Attorney, Davis County, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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